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Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Access Med., LLC, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 10 (Mar. 11, 2021)1
CONTRACT LAW: INSURER’S DUTY TO DEFEND; RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT OF
LEGAL FEES AND COSTS; UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Summary
Most standard liability insurance policies impose a duty on the insurer to defend its
policyholder against suits by third parties seeking damages covered by the policy. However,
insurers and policyholders often disagree as to whether the insurer’s duty to defend is triggered by
a particular suit, and these disputes can rarely be resolved before the policyholder is required to
defend the third party’s suit. As a result, insurers often offer to pay for the defense, while reserving
its right to seek restitution if a court later determines that it did not have the duty to do so.
In Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Access Med., LLC, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, under Nevada
Rule of Appellate Procedure 5, asked the Supreme Court of Nevada whether an insurer is entitled
to reimbursement of costs already expended in defense of its insureds where it has been determined
that the insurer owed no duty to defend and the insurer expressly reserved its right to seek
reimbursement. The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that the answer is yes: when a party to
a contract performs a disputed obligation under protest and a court later determines that the
contract did not require performance, the party may ordinarily recover in restitution. Further, the
Court concluded that this rule not only applies to insurance policies, but to any other contract.
Background
Ted Switzer and respondents were former business partners who sold medical devices until
their relationship soured. Switzer filed a cross-complaint against respondents alleging, among
other things, that respondents interfered with his prospective economic advantage. During
discovery, respondents uncovered an email showing that one of their representatives approached
a hospital administrator to discuss the sale of certain medical devices. In this email, the
representative stated that Switzer had been banned from selling those medical devices.
Respondents requested their insurer, Nautilus, to defend them in against Switzer’s claim
because under their insurance policy, Nautilus was required to defend respondents against suits
seeking damages because of a personal and advertising injury arising out of any oral or written
publication of material that defames a person or organization. Although Nautilus initially declined
to defend, it eventually agreed, while expressly reserving its rights to disclaim coverage, withdraw
from defense, and obtain a reimbursement of defense fees if a court determined that Nautilus never
had a duty to defend respondents under their contract.
Nautilus began to defend respondents against Switzer’s suit while simultaneously seeking
a declaratory judgment in a Nevada federal district court, stating that it had no duty to defend
respondents. The federal district court granted the declaratory judgment, concluding that the
parties’ insurance policy was never triggered because Switzer’s cross-complaint did not allege,
and the email found during discovery did not contain, a false statement that would support a claim
for defamation. Accordingly, Nautilus moved for relief, seeking reimbursement of the expenses it
had already incurred while defending respondents. However, the district court concluded that
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Nautilus was not entitled to such relief because it did not establish that it was entitled to
reimbursement under Nevada law.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that Nautilus did not have a duty
to defend respondents. However, it concluded it could not determine whether Nautilus was entitled
to reimbursement because this question turned on an unresolved issue of Nevada state law. Noting
a split of authority among other state courts, the Ninth Circuit certified the question to the Nevada
Supreme Court, which accepted the invitation to provide an answer because the question presented
an issue of first impression in Nevada.
Discussion
Standard of review
The Court only accepts certification of “questions of law” under NRAP 5. These questions
of law are decided de novo in accordance with the purpose of a certified question, which is to
clarify its state’s law when there is no controlling precedent.2 The Court does not revisit the
certifying court’s factual determinations.
No contract governs the right to reimbursement here
Nautilus invoked the theory of unjust enrichment to argue that it is entitled to
reimbursement. Respondents argued that unjust enrichment is not available when there is an
express, written contract covering the same subject matter. Therefore, respondents contended that
only the insurance policy governed this dispute.
While noting that any other contract would ordinarily govern similar disputes, the Court
concluded that the “duty to defend from defamation suits” clause was never triggered here. As the
federal district court held, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the email did not contain a false
statement that would support a claim for defamation.
Accordingly, the Court gave no weight to respondents’ arguments concerning the scope of
the insurer’s duty to defend, since the federal courts had already done that: they determined that
Nautilus never owed a duty to defend. Finally, because the contract between the parties did not
apply to this dispute, the Court held that the existence of the contract did not foreclose an unjust
enrichment claim.
A party that performs a disputed obligation under protest, and does not in fact have a duty to
perform, is entitled to reimbursement
The Court then turned to the merits of Nautilus’s unjust enrichment claim. The Court
determined that Nautilus conferred a benefit onto the respondents by defending them against the
defamation suit, and that respondents accepted Nautilus’s defense. The central issue then became
whether equity requires respondents to reimburse Nautilus for a benefit it provided when it did not
have a duty to do so.
Insurance companies tend to defend policyholders even when they do not believe they have
a duty to do so, because if they were to refuse to defend and a court later determined that they did
have a duty to defend, insurers may be subject to significant liability. Further, because insurers
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don’t have the time to obtain a declaratory judgment from a court stating whether it has a duty to
defend before defense action must be taken in a claim, it makes sense to decide quickly what to
do, and to litigate later who must pay. The Court found this to be reasonable.
The Court concluded that when a court determines that the insurer never had contractual a
duty to defend, and the insurer clearly and expressly reserved its right to seek reimbursement, it is
equitable to require the policyholder to reimburse the insurer for defense expenses already paid.
The Court held that, because the law has encouraged insurers to offer to defend doubtful claims, it
is only fair to allow insurers to recover costs that they never agreed to bear in the first place.
Restitution does not modify the contract
Some courts have held that reimbursement is “tantamount to allowing the insurer to extract
a unilateral amendment to the insurance contract.”3 Similarly, respondents argued that the policy’s
express language required Nautilus to bear “all expenses it incurs” for any claim it chooses to
defend, whether or not the policy required it to defend that claim in the first place.
Because the majority’s opinion inspired a dissent that agreed with this argument, the Court
took another opportunity to reiterate its disagreement with the respondents’ argument. It restated
its reasoning that when a court holds that there never was a duty to defend, it is holding that the
claims were never even potentially covered by the policy. Therefore, when an insurer reserved its
right to seek reimbursement, it is not extracting an amendment to a contract that would otherwise
govern its defense because, after all, no contract governed its defense.
Restitution does not erode the duty to defend
The Court strongly disagreed with the view that permitting reimbursement would amount
to a retroactive erosion of the broad duty to defend and narrow the long-standing view that the
duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. The Court recognized that it is true that, in
Nevada, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify because an insurer must defend
even claims that the third party does not ultimately prove. But the duty to defend is not absolute.
And when a court holds that a claim was never covered, then the court should hold that the duty
to defend never arose. Accordingly, a consequence of such holding is that the insurer may be
entitled to reimbursement if it reserved its rights.
Here, the parties contracted for Nautilus to defend against certain kinds of allegations, and
the federal courts have determined that the allegation against the respondents were not of that kind.
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that is not eroding the duty to defend by acknowledging its
existing limits.
Conclusion
In providing an answer to the Ninth Circuit’s certified question, the Supreme Court
clarified that, in Nevada, (1) when a court determines that an insurer never owed a duty to defend,
(2) the insurer expressly reserved its right to seek reimbursement in writing after defense was
tendered, and (3) the policyholder accepted the defense from the insurer, then the insurer is entitled
to that reimbursement. This holding stems from generally applicable principles of unjust
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enrichment and restitution, wherein the insurer confers a benefit to the policyholder, who
appreciates the benefit, and because it is reasonable for the insurer to accede to the policyholder’s
demand, it is equitable to require the policyholder to pay.

